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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 06-2114
                    
DIANA HUTCHINSON,
                                      Appellant
v.
TODD SCULL; DOES 1-10;
BENNIGANS/METROMEDIA
RESTAURANT, INC.
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-05364
District Judge:  The Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 26, 2007
                    
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed July 18, 2007)
                    
OPINION
                    
2BARRY, Circuit Judge
I.
Diana Hutchinson filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey which
defendants removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  In
her Amended Complaint filed after removal, Hutchinson charged Todd Scull and
Bennigans/Metromedia Restaurant, Inc., with race, national origin, and age discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et
seq.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted defendants’
motion and denied Hutchinson’s.  Hutchinson appealed.  We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm.
II.
Hutchinson is a Jamaican-American woman in her mid-fifties who was hired in
1984 to serve as a cook at the Bennigan’s Restaurant in Springfield, New Jersey.  In
1989, she became a full-time host and eventually was promoted to head host.
On the evening of December 8, 2000, a female customer accused Hutchinson and
another host, Elaine Lambert, of staring at her and her girlfriend and making
inappropriate comments to her because of her sexual orientation.  When the general
manager, Todd Scull, arrived at the restaurant the next day, he learned what had happened
and called the customer, who was still upset.  She told Scull how rude the women had
     1  Title VII does not cover claims of discrimination based on age, Kremer v. Chemical
Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.4 (1982), and Hutchinson does not bring a claim under
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been to her, the statements they had made, and reiterated that she felt discriminated
against because of her sexual orientation.  Scull found the allegations to be serious;
believed that he was required, therefore, to terminate both hosts; and, in fact, did so. 
Thereafter, Bennigan’s hired an African-American male to replace Hutchinson as head
host.
III.
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Kautz v.
Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is proper “if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Summary judgment will be warranted only if the
record contains insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the
nonmoving party at trial.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
All facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.  Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 369 F.3d 227, 228 n.1 (3d Cir.
2004).
IV.
We analyze Hutchinson’s claim of discriminatory discharge, as did the District
Court, by applying the familiar burden-shifting framework the Supreme Court enunciated
in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).1  Under this
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
Accordingly, we evaluate her age discrimination claim only under the NJLAD.  We
nevertheless apply the McDonnell Douglas framework because, as the Supreme Court of
New Jersey has observed, New Jersey courts have “frequently looked to case law under
Title VII ... for guidance in developing standards to govern the resolution of [NJ]LAD
claims.”  Carmona v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 915 A.2d 518, 528 (N.J. 2007). 
See also Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 954 (N.J. 1999) (adopting the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate an age discrimination claim).
     2  We also reject without further discussion Hutchinson’s argument that the District
Court erred in “determining summary judgment . . . without a hearing thus creating a
record for appeal . . . .”  Br. at 2.  We note, however, that the appendix on appeal numbers
more than a thousand pages.  
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framework, Hutchinson must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on
race, age, or national origin.  If she succeeds, the burden shifts to defendants to produce
evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason or reasons for terminating her. 
Hutchinson must then show that defendants’ articulated reason or reasons were a pretext
for discrimination.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
The District Court found, first, that Hutchinson failed to make out a prima facie
case of race or national origin discrimination because, as to the former, her job was
ultimately filled by a member of the protected African-American class and, as to the
latter, she alleged no facts that would permit an inference that her termination had
anything to do with anti-Jamaican motives.  While Hutchinson claims that the District
Court erred in these regards, she offers little to support that claim and we reject it without
further discussion.2  As for the age discrimination claim, and although there was no
evidence as to whether her replacement was or was not under the age of 40, the Court
     3  We, thus, disagree with the parties that the District Court reached the issue of pretext
on all three claims of discrimination.  
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found that the claim failed because Hutchinson failed to carry her burden of showing that
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or reasons given for her termination were a
pretext for age discrimination.3  Stated somewhat differently, even assuming that
Hutchinson established a prima facie case of age discrimination, no reasonable jury
would believe that  defendants’ reason or reasons for terminating her were illegitimate or
that “invidious discriminat[ion] . . . was more likely than not” a motivating factor. 
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Hutchinson takes issue with the legitimacy of the reasons or, as the District Court
put it, the “two key points” invoked by defendants and argues that she showed the
requisite pretext.  A14.  The customer’s accusation that Hutchinson (and Lambert)
discriminated against her because of her sexual orientation was the initial and stated
reason for the termination of the two women.  Hutchinson does not dispute that the
customer complained and that Hutchinson was terminated immediately following the
complaint; she merely questions whether the customer should have taken offense.  As the
District Court found, “For the purposes of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it is not
relevant whether the customer was right or wrong to complain; what matters is that the
customer did make a complaint to management.”  As defendants argued, and the District
Court also found, the complaint appeared in the context of a “considerable” history of job
performance problems, problems which Hutchinson did not specifically contest but only
6“countered with the unsubstantiated allegations that Defendants have concocted
fraudulent evidence.”  A14, 18.  
Hutchinson argues that these reasons were unworthy of belief because, although
not disputing that she was terminated immediately on the heels of the customer’s
complaint of discrimination or the “considerable” evidence of her job performance
difficulties, she claims to have been a good employee.  The minimal evidence she offered
in support of that claim does not begin to call into question the basis for her termination
which, the District Court found, was legitimate and nondiscriminatory.  And while she
has pointed to a male coworker under 40 who, she states, was supposedly “similarly
situated” but  received more favorable treatment than she did following a customer
complaint, he, too, was immediately terminated.  Although he was subsequently rehired,
Hutchinson has neither alleged nor established that she sought to be rehired.  
There is simply no evidence that age, race, or national origin played any part in the
decision to terminate Hutchinson.  
V.
We will affirm the order of the District Court.  
 
